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Defensive Competitive Strategies in Two-Sided 
Markets: The Example of the Mail Industry 
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Abstract 
This paper outlines and analyzes different competitive strategies for an established platform 
provider in a two-sided market to defend against various forms of attack. Taking into account 
the characteristics of two-sided markets, we consider strategies based on product innovation 
and network effects, process innovation and pricing, multiple platforms, and switching costs. 
Network effects introduce dynamics that can quickly displace an incumbent platform. 
However, a platform provider can also use network effects to its advantage, entrenching itself 
firmly in the market by using appropriate strategies. These strategies are developed 
theoretically and illustrated by example of the mail industry. 
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Two-sided markets are markets that link two different groups of businesses and/or consumers 
together (Rochet, 2006). This link is typically facilitated by a business serving as the market’s 
platform. This platform provides the infrastructure and rules needed to enable an efficient 
exchange between the groups. Such two-sided markets are also called two-sided platform-
mediated markets.  
Two-sided markets are not a new phenomenon. Some traditional examples are mail 
companies linking senders and receivers of mail, shopping malls linking shops and customers, 
newspapers linking advertisers and readers, and real estate brokers linking home sellers and 
home buyers. With the spreading of modern communications technology and the Internet, 
two-sided markets have become even more prevalent. Some modern examples are online 
auctioning platforms linking sellers and buyers, computer operating systems linking 
application developers and clients, credit card companies linking merchants and cardholders, 
web search engines linking advertisers and searchers, recruitment sites linking employers and 
job seekers, and clearing and settlement service providers linking financial institutions that 
send and receive payments. 
The users of a two-sided market form a network. The main characteristic of any network is 
that the number and quality of connections among the network’s users influence the benefit of 
other users. The effects of these connections on the other users are called network effects. In 
any two-sided market, there are two different types of network effects: same-side effects and 
cross-side effects (see Figure 1). Section 2 explains why network effects occur, whether they 
are positive or negative, and what their consequences on a network’s users are. 




























In the course of the dot-com boom, a large number of platforms have been launched. Many of 
those that have not disappeared again are under constant pressure to fend off new competitors. 
Some of the initially diverse markets, like the online search market, the online auctioning 
market, and the personal computer operating systems’ market, are now largely dominated by a 
single platform. Other markets, such as the market for credit cards, are controlled by a small 
number of dominant platforms. The fact that industry concentration is as high as it is in many 
two-sided markets gives an indication of the importance of being able to defend one’s 
position in a two-sided market. Whether or not a platform established in a two-sided market is 
able to deal with attacks on its position is of vital importance to any platform’s long-term 
success. This paper deals with precisely this question: What are the factors enabling an 
established platform in a two-sided market to defend its position against competitors and new 
entrants, and what are the defensive strategies required? 
In order to answer this question, Section 3 considers defensive strategies based on product 
innovation and network effects, process optimization and pricing, multiple platforms, and 
switching costs. A platform’s options for defending its position are illustrated through 
examples from the mail industry. Mail markets are important traditional two-sided markets 
that have been widely researched. Furthermore, since Europe’s mail markets are currently 
being liberalized, the question of how to defend an established platform’s position is a topical 
subject for this industry. 
2. Network Effects in Two-Sided Platform-Mediated Markets 
In normal product or service markets, a customer only cares whether or not and at what price 
he or she obtains a product. A customer does not consider whether or not other customers buy 
the same product. In contrast to this fact, users of a network usually care whether or not there 
are other users in the network. In other words, users affect other users and exhibit so-called 
network effects. The simplest types of network only connect users of essentially a single user 
type. Such networks can take a wide variety of different forms (see Economides, 1996). 
Two-sided platform-mediated markets are specially structured networks with two distinct 
types of user on each side. The most important connections of such networks are the 
connections between these two sides. Facilitating these connections is the main function of a 
platform. For example, a mail company facilitates businesses sending mail to consumers. 
Typically, such potential cross-side connections are of some positive value to users on both 
sides, i.e. there are positive cross-side effects. 
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In addition to affecting users on the opposite side, users also affect other users on the same 
side, i.e. there are same-side network effects. These same-side effects typically do not occur 
on the platform’s initiative. However, in some cases, a platform tries to encourage or 
discourage same-side communication. Table 1 shows what types of network effect there are in 
two-sided markets, and whether these effects are usually positive or negative. 
Table 1: Types of Network Effect 
Cross-Side Network Effects Same-Side Network Effects 
B2B 
Usually positive 





or negative C2B 
B2B: business-to-business, C2C: consumer-to-consumer  
B2C: business-to-consumer, C2B: consumer-to-business 
In symmetric markets with businesses on both sides, businesses usually want as many 
businesses available on opposite sides as possible, i.e. cross-side B2B effects are usually 
positive. For example, a business deciding on what mail company to engage in cooperation 
with wants a mail company to be able to deliver mail to as many different companies as 
possible. Similarly, in symmetric markets with consumers on both sides, consumers usually 
want as many consumers available on opposite sides as possible, i.e. cross-side C2C effects 
are usually positive as well. For example, individuals sending private letters want the mail 
company actually to deliver these letters to any individual of their choosing. 
Asymmetric markets with businesses on one side and consumers on the other side are the 
most common type of two-sided market. In such markets, businesses usually want as many 
consumers available as possible. Similarly, consumers typically want as many businesses 
available as possible. Phrased differently, both the cross-side B2C effects and the cross-side 
C2B effects are normally positive. For example, a mail company that can deliver mail to a 
large number of households is more attractive to a business than a company only delivering to 
a smaller number of households. Similarly, few consumers would go to the effort of 
periodically emptying their mailbox if they could only receive mail from a single company. 
In any two-sided market, businesses usually want as few businesses as possible on the same 
side, i.e. same-side B2B effects are usually negative. For example, all other things being 
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equal, a business typically makes less profit if there are a greater number of other businesses 
sending mail to the same consumers, since this additional mail absorbs some attention from 
the consumers. More precisely, same-side effects among businesses advertising their services 
are negative if the products or services advertised are substitutes for each other, assuming that 
prices stay constant. If the products or services advertised are complements, however, same-
side effects may be positive.1 
Whether consumers prefer to have more or fewer consumers on their own side must be 
determined for each instance individually, i.e. same-side C2C effects can be positive, neutral, 
or negative depending on the actual situation. In mail markets, for example, the direction of 
this effect depends on the type of products or services advertised. Regarding advertisements 
for some network products, consumers want other consumers to receive them as well. For 
some advertisements, consumers do not care whether other consumers receive them or not. As 
far as some limited offers are concerned, consumers do not want other consumers to receive 
the same offers.  
As illustrated by this last example, the directions of the same-side network effects are 
determined by the actual preferences of businesses or consumers. With strong positive cross-
side effects, however, it is possible that users actually benefit from other users on the same 
side even though same-side effects are negative. This outcome occurs if the positive impact of 
the cross-side effects overrides the negative impact of the same-side effects. As illustrated by 
the above example, consumers prefer other consumers not to receive the same advertisements 
for some limited offers. The businesses sending out advertisements may, however, only be 
willing to pay for the mail company’s service if mail is sent to a large number of consumers. 
Hence, consumers actually benefit from other consumers, since without them they would 
receive nothing. Nonetheless, same-side effects among consumers remain negative. 
                                                            
1
 In reality, prices usually do not stay constant, complicating the analysis. There is a complementary relationship 
between senders with regard to the costs of a mail company. Due to economies of scale and economies of 
density, a mail company can send mail at lower costs if the amount of mail per customer increases. Thus, if the 
market is at least partially competitive, a mail company incurring lower costs also lowers its prices. Since 
senders prefer lower prices, there is also an indirect, positive effect on the sender’s preference with regard to 
other senders. 
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3. Defensive Strategies in Two-Sided Platform-Mediated Markets 
A defensive strategy is a plan to deal successfully with any challenge posed by competitors 
that attempt to enter the market under consideration. A successful defense requires the 
established platform provider first and foremost to strengthen its position by offering the most 
attractive service. Section 3.1 considers how an established platform provider can invest in 
product innovations and make use of network effects in order to strengthen its position. 
Section 3.2 then considers the opposite end of the spectrum. It looks at how a platform 
provider can make use of process innovations and derive an appropriate pricing strategy in 
order to make its price-service bundle competitive. Section 3.3 looks at how a platform 
provider established in multiple markets can make use of its combined market power to 
become even more entrenched in each market. Section 3.4 considers how an established 
platform provider can use switching costs to its advantage. 
3.1. Product Innovation and Making Use of Network Effects 
If cross-side effects are positive, a platform provider can make its platform more attractive to 
users of a particular type by attracting more users of the other type. In order to achieve this 
goal, a platform provider can generally make use of any means used by ordinary business. In 
particular, a platform can invest in the development of innovative products. For example, mail 
companies have made large investments in the development of product innovations (see Dietl 
et al., 2006 for an overview).  
Even if the cost of innovation is the same for platforms of two-sided markets as for traditional 
businesses, all other things being equal, the benefit of product innovations is greater. This 
increased benefit from product innovations results from the fact that even if a particular 
innovation is only attractive to any single user side, positive cross-side effects lead to an 
increased utility for the other user side as well. Furthermore, if an innovation is of direct use 
to both user sides, positive cross-side effects also result in an additional, indirect increase in 
utility to both user sides. Hence, due to cross-side effects, product innovation is an especially 
attractive strategy for platform providers. 
Similarly to making use of positive cross-side effects, a platform provider can make use of 
positive same-side effects. If same-side effects for a particular user group are positive, the 
value of each additional customer increases exponentially. For this reason, aggressive 
expansion is called for. The situation becomes more interesting if the same-side effects are 
negative. In this case, limiting the size of a user group makes a platform more attractive to 
these users, allowing the platform provider to charge more for its services. Before deciding to 
7 
limit one of its user groups, however, a platform provider must determine that the gain in 
profit due to the negative same-side effects is not outweighed by the decrease in profit due to 
the positive cross-side effects. 
The example of B2C mail can serve to illustrate the strategy of artificially limiting the size of 
some user groups. In some jurisdictions, households can opt to attach signs to their letter 
boxes that prevent them from receiving any unaddressed mail. Although this measure 
decreases the number of consumers for unaddressed mail, the value of sending any piece of 
unaddressed mail to a consumer increases, since unaddressed mail is only sent to those 
consumers who are presumably willing to receive such mail. As a result, the mail company 
can charge a higher price for each piece of unaddressed mail delivered than it could charge 
without having restricted its base of receivers. 
3.2. Process Optimization and Pricing the Platform Competitively 
In principle, the same fundamental pricing mechanisms that apply to other businesses apply to 
platform providers as well. In particular, in order for a platform to be competitive in the long 
run, the total revenue has to cover the total costs. A platform provider continually working to 
optimize its processes is difficult to displace. Recognizing this fact, Europe’s major mail 
companies have recently made a large effort to optimize their processes in order to lower 
costs and to be ready for potential competition (WIK, 2007). 
Platform providers of two-sided markets also have a variety of pricing instruments at their 
disposal which are not usually available to traditional businesses. Some of these instruments 
stem from the peculiarity that, under some circumstances, a platform provider’s balance does 
not have to add up for each user side even if the market is competitive. The reason is that the 
services of a platform provider to any single user side are typically not interchangeable with 
the services of a competing platform. Hence, usually there is no direct competition for any 
single side on its own, but only for all services of a platform. This circumstance allows a 
platform provider some additional flexibility with regard to pricing. Specifically, a platform 
provider can price its services to one side below costs, and compensate for these local losses 
by increasing the prices on the other side, that is by cross-subsidization (Armstrong and 
Wright, 2007). 
When determining whether or not to subsidize a side, a platform provider must consider 
several factors. First, a platform provider must make sure that the user side subsidizing the 
other side cannot substitute the services for the services of another platform. If the services 
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provided to a user side are easily interchangeable with the services of a rival platform, this 
side can still potentially be on the receiving end of subsidization. However, such a user side 
cannot be on the giving end, because competition drives the prices of the interchangeable 
services down to their marginal costs.  
For example, in the mail industry, senders of mail can be differentiated geographically 
according to whether they send mail to urban or to rural areas. Customers sending mail to 
urban areas typically subsidize customers sending mail to urban areas. The reason for this fact 
is that the universal service obligation of a country usually compels mail companies to deliver 
mail to any place within the country at the same price. However, the cost of delivery varies 
between urban and rural areas. As long as customers sending mail to urban areas cannot 
switch to a competitor in order to have their mail delivered, a unique price for delivery to all 
areas does not pose much of a problem. If, however, customers can choose among different 
mail companies, customers sending mail to urban areas have an incentive to switch to a 
competitor that delivers at marginal costs, since these are lower than the unique price charged 
by the established mail company. Hence, a price system where customers sending mail to 
urban areas subsidize customers sending mail to rural areas only works as long as customers 
sending mail to urban areas cannot just switch to another mail company.2 
If the services supplied to either one or both user sides are not interchangeable with the 
services of a rival, then the price sensitivity of both user sides should be compared. In general, 
the side whose users are more sensitive to price changes should be subsidized by the other 
side (see e.g. Faulhaber, 1975). For example, mail companies subsidize receivers of mail 
through senders of mail since receivers are typically less willing to pay for mail than senders 
(Friedli et al., 2006). Subsidizing receivers through senders is achieved by the prepaid-
principle of paying for the postage by buying stamps. 
In a two-sided network with a supplier of a service on the one hand and consumers highly 
sensitive to quality on the other hand, the suppliers should generally subsidize the side 
demanding quality services. The reason is that such a method of subsidization increases the 
number of users demanding services, which in turn makes investments in quality more 
lucrative for the suppliers, finally increasing the network’s overall attractiveness. Eisenmann 
et al. (2006) give the example of the video game industry, where the hardware is sold below 
                                                            
2
 In fact, this issue is one of the most prominent arguments against the liberalization of the mail industry; see e.g. 
Crew and Kleindorfer (2005). 
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costs. Only by subsidizing end users in this way is the platform’s user base sufficiently large 
so that it pays for companies to develop the quality software that users demand. 
In addition to these considerations, a platform provider should pay attention to actual and 
potential competitors. If an existing or a new competitor attacks the position of an established 
platform by targeting one particular user side, cross-subsidization may allow the established 
platform to lower its prices for this user side without incurring an overall loss and thus 
securing its position. 
3.3. Making Use of Multiple Markets 
A platform provider that is active in multiple two-sided markets can strengthen its position in 
one market by making use of its market power in another market. Such a platform provider 
can transfer (or ‘leverage’) some of its market power in a primary market onto a secondary 
market without its market power in the primary market being diminished. The means for this 
transfer to happen can involve the tying of a service supplied in a primary market with 
another service supplied in a secondary market. 
Tying a service from a primary market together with a service from another market means 
that users can only buy the right to access both services; users cannot buy the right to access 
only one service at the exclusion of the other service. This practice effectively ensures that the 
user base in the secondary market increases. A platform provider may initially sell the bundle 
of both services at a price lower than it would charge for just a single service. In this case, the 
platform provider foregoes some immediate profit in order to build up the user base in the 
secondary market. Such pricing is sensible, especially in networked markets, where network 
effects increase a platform’s profit disproportionately with additional users. 
Tying is a common phenomenon in mail markets. Sending mail involves at least four major 
services: collection, sorting, transportation, and delivery. Traditionally, mail companies 
enjoyed a monopoly and only offered all of these services as a single bundle. As long as these 
services are tied together, the incumbent mail companies can effectively keep their dominant 
position in all the markets for these services even if competition is allowed. Recognizing this 
fact, when the European Union decided to introduce competition into its mail markets, it also 
decided that the incumbent mail companies must offer their services separately.3 This 
                                                            
3
 See the European Union’s directive 2002/39/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 10 June 2002 
amending directive 97/67/EC with regard to the further opening to competition of community postal services, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/. 
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important ruling very clearly shows how potent a defensive measure tying can be. In fact, 
tying is such a potent measure that it is often prevented by antitrust law.4 
Tying is not necessarily harmful for the economy as a whole. It only becomes problematic 
when a platform provider has a dominant position in one of the markets. A platform dominant 
in one important primary market can effectively drive competitors out of any other secondary 
market. This outcome can happen because users buying a service in the primary market 
automatically buy services in the secondary market. For this reason, such users are no longer 
willing to pay a competitor for its services in the secondary market, therefore extending the 
platform provider’s dominance to other markets. 
Besides the tying of services, there is a related measure that allows a platform provider to use 
its position in one market to gain influence in another market which is less prone to 
prevention by law. This measure involves making use of overlapping user bases. Overlapping 
user bases refer to users present in multiple markets all served by the same platform provider. 
Figure 2 illustrates a simple case of two overlapping user bases. A strategy involving 
overlapping user bases involves taking advantage of marketing possibilities resulting from 
already existing customer relations. For example, mail companies have recently begun to take 
advantage of their extensive network of offices and large number of customers in order to 
expand into other markets, such as the financial, insurance, payment, and retail markets. 
Initially, mail companies benefit from their position in mail markets. Eventually, being active 
in multiple markets also has the potential to increase customer loyalty for mail markets. 
                                                            
4
 Antitrust law fundamentally differs among jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, some potentially 
anticompetitive measures are not allowed unless it can be shown that they do not prevent effective competition. 
In other jurisdictions, all measures are generally allowed unless it can be shown that they prevent effective 
competition. Despite these fundamental legal differences, antitrust law always relies on economic analysis. 
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Figure 2: Overlapping User Bases 
 
3.4. Taking Advantage of Switching Costs 
Switching costs are the combined costs resulting from switching from a certain product or 
service to another substitute. Switching costs include learning costs, transaction costs, and 
contractual costs (Klemperer, 1987). Learning costs refer to the effort needed to become 
acquainted with the new product or service. Transaction costs refer to the costs associated 
with the actual economic exchange of a product or service, such as the costs resulting from 
acquiring information, the costs related to bargaining, the costs resulting from monitoring the 
contractual partner, and the costs of enforcing an agreement. Contractual costs refer to the 
legally agreed costs resulting from entering or leaving a contract for a product or service, such 
as advance payments and cancellation fees.5 
Switching costs are to the advantage of the established platform providers that are more 
interested in defending their user bases against competition than in acquiring new users. 
Hence, maintaining and if feasible increasing switching costs are an important aspect of any 
established platform provider’s defensive strategy. Compared with standard product or service 
markets, increasing switching costs is an especially attractive strategy for platform providers 
in two-sided markets. A platform provider has added incentives to invest in increasing its 
users’ switching costs, since by increasing one user side’s switching costs, positive cross-side 
network effects ensure that other users have added incentives to stay as well. 
In order to maximize profits, an established platform provider must aim not just to prevent its 
users from leaving its platform; it must also prevent its users from joining another competing 
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 There is no universally accepted definition of switching costs, nor is there a universally accepted complete 
listing of the types of switching costs. The important fact to remember is that switching costs are more than just 
the financial costs directly associated with the switch of a product or service.  









platform at the same time. That is, an established platform provider must ensure that users are 
not active on multiple competing platforms simultaneously. Besides offering an attractive 
price–service bundle, preventing users from leaving a platform can be ensured by contractual 
means such as cancellation fees and extended periods of cancellation.  
However, typically it is not feasible to prevent users from joining competing platforms by 
contractual means. In case the product or service is especially complicated in its application, 
high learning costs may prevent users from joining multiple competing platforms. Technical 
means, such as locked SIM cards in mobile telecommunications, can also ensure that users 
remain active only on a single platform. If users cannot be prevented from joining a 
competing platform by technical means, and if the learning costs associated with joining a 
competing platform are low, platform providers must rely on incentive-based means. 
Incentive-based means for preventing users from joining multiple platforms come in a variety 
of forms. Most commonly, platform providers make use of nonlinear pricing. Forms of 
nonlinear pricing that lend themselves to ensuring customer loyalty include two-part pricing 
and volume discounts. Two-part pricing refers to pricing schemes where both fixed and 
variable components are charged. In order to reach the desired loyalty effect, the fixed 
component must be sufficiently high. Volume discounts and other volume-based incentive 
programs also make it more attractive for users to be active only on a single platform at one 
time. 
Established mail companies benefit from switching costs. During recent years, mail 
companies enjoyed state monopolies over some mail products. During these years, users 
learned how to use some services of the established mail companies only. Users switching to 
other mail companies have to relearn how to use these services, i.e. there are learning costs 
associated with a switch. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, established mail companies can 
give volume discounts to some of their large business customers, although in other 
jurisdictions, regulation does not allow for this option.  
With regard to switching costs, an issue that should be taken into account at all times is the 
so-called penguin effect (Choi, 1997). This effect captures the idea that users of a network 
considering switching networks are at first highly reluctant to test the waters of a new 
network. However, once the first few users have made the switch, many others follow 
quickly. This effect’s significance with regard to the management of an established platform 
provider is that a platform provider must be very aggressive in retaining as many users as 
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possible. An established platform provider allowing even a small number of users to switch 
risks the future loss of a large portion of its user base due to the dynamics introduced by the 
network’s positive network effects. 
4. Conclusion 
Compared with traditional markets, cross-side and same-side network effects introduce some 
added dynamics to two-sided platform-mediated markets. By taking these dynamics into 
account and following an appropriate competitive strategy, an established platform provider 
can become very difficult to displace. 
One strategy for strengthening its position lies in the aggressive investment in product 
innovations. Such a strategy is particularly viable for platform providers, since even though 
the cost of innovation is the same as for other business models, the benefit of product 
innovations is greater. In addition to the cross-side effects, a platform provider’s strategy must 
also take the same-side effects into account. 
In order to secure its position, a platform provider must offer not just services of a high 
quality, it must also offer these services at attractive prices. In order to be able to price its 
services competitively, a platform provider must continually work on optimizing its 
processes. Even though a platform’s total revenue has to cover its total costs, as for any 
business, a platform provider has some added flexibility with regard to pricing. In particular, a 
platform provider can cross-subsidize, i.e. price its services to one side below costs, and 
compensate for these local losses by increasing the prices on the other side. Appropriate 
cross-subsidization allows a platform to increase its total revenue without increasing its total 
costs. In addition to improving a platform’s balance position, cross-subsidization can also be 
an effective tool in defending against attacks by competitors specifically targeting a particular 
user side. 
A business providing platforms in multiple two-sided markets has some further options for 
strengthening its market power in each individual market. Specifically, by tying some of its 
products or services from different markets together, a platform provider can transfer some of 
its market power in one market onto another market. Besides the tying of services, a platform 
provider can make use of overlapping user bases in order to transfer some of its market power 
onto other markets, and eventually strengthen its position in the original market.  
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An active management of switching costs must be part of any established business’s defensive 
strategy. Two-sided markets’ platform providers can make especially good use of defensive 
strategies based on user switching costs, since increasing one user side’s switching costs also 
improves the other side’s user loyalty. 
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